The rise of the populist radical political right is one of the significant phenomena in recent European party politics. In this article, I examine the ideology of the radical right in Finland by analysing the Aloof Election Manifesto, an election platform published by radical wing of the Finns Party for national parliament elections 2011. The analysis shows that the ideology challenges traditional notions of nationalism. It combines cultural nativism, secularism and economic neoliberalism to the fear of Islam and multiculturalism.
In this article, I examine the ideology of the anti-immigrant wing of the Finns Party, a populist and nationalist political party that represents one of the most visible changes on the Finnish political landscape in recent years. For 16 years, the party was a small one, its support being three to four percent 1 . This changed drastically in 2011, when the party received 19.1 percent of the votes in the national parliamentary elections and secured 39 seats of 200 in Parliament, 15 percentage points and 34 seats more than in the previous parliamentary elections in 2007 . It was the largest increase in a single party's support between parliamentary elections in Finnish political history since the Second World War (Borg 2012) . The Finns Party became part of the government for the first time after the parliamentary elections in 2015, in which it received 17.7 percent of the votes and 38 seats. Currently, the party holds four ministerial posts.
I concentrate on one particular text, a platform that 13 candidates of the party wrote for the 2011 national elections. The platform, the Aloof Election Manifesto (hereinafter AM) is a short text, comprising 1842 words in 12 short sections. The text presents arguments and demands for a new, strict immigration policy. The authors of the text represent the most visible 'immigration critics', a radical, relatively independent though informal political fraction inside the more moderate mother party, the Finns Party . Eight of them have a background in the nationalist, radical right organisation Suomen Sisu, which was founded in the 1990s on the ideology of the European fascist 'Third Position'. Six of the 13 writers of the manifesto were elected to Parliament in 2011 (Koivulaakso, Brunila & Andersson 2012) .
It is typical of contemporary populism that it contains diverse ideological features. As Niko Pyrhönen puts it, populism is very much a moving target: it is a strategic action field rather than a clear ideology (Pyrhönen 2015: 11; also Zúquete 2008; Laclau 2005: 73, 129-132) . My overall aim is to show that this applies to the AM, which indeed combines diverse ideas and beliefs from different ideological traditions. The AM represents a particular case within neo-populism, however, as it concentrates solely on opposing immigration from the Third World. Accordingly, one of the specific aims of my article is to show how different ideological features are used to support this goal in the case of the AM. By doing so, I contribute to the European debate on the nature and development of parties that represent or are close to neo-populism or that more openly embrace the new radical right.
While the ideas that are represented in the AM can be found in other texts written by its authors, as a political speech act the AM is unique. It is the first and, to date, the only paper in which the 'immigration critics' of the Finns Party present their fundamental ideas as an existing, relatively unanimous political group. In fact, one intention of the AM was to construct a reality in which the fundamental ideas of the anti-immigrant political right in Finland would be supported not only by single nonconformists, but also by a plausible, 'responsible' and 'truly democratic' (see Canovan 1999, 2) political movement.
Furthermore, the AM was important for the electoral success of the Finns Party in 2011 in general. The party adopted many of the core ideas of the manifesto into its main election platform (Koivulaakso, Brunila & Andersson 2012) . These ideas were welcomed by the voters: the second most popular reason for voting for the Finns Party was a desire to tighten the country's immigration policy [the most important reason was a desire to bring about a change in what was seen as a self-sufficient party system (Borg 2012, 208) ]. Immigration politics were important, especially for the permanent supporters of the party (Borg 2012, 208) .
As noted above, my focus is the AM. Additionally, I refer to other writings of the authors of the AM to clarify some claims that are presented in the manifesto. Some of the authors (especially MEP Jussi Halla-Aho, Finnish MP Olli Immonen and former Finnish MP James Hirvisaari) have been very active in social media both before and after the release of the AM. I use texts that they have written in that context as secondary sources.
In order to show what kind of (partly implicit) political categories authors of the AM construct, I make use of discourse analysis. By discourse I refer to a structure of cultural and social rules that shape the possibilities for understanding and action (Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992: 90; Foucault 2007) . Discourses reflect and construct the power relations between actors and ideas. Often discursive power is not explicit or openly visible. It exerts its influence through categorising, normalisation and self-control (Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992: 90; Foucault 2009: 5; Foucault 1980: 272) .
Furthermore, like Finnish scholar Sami Moisio, I draw a distinction between rhetoric and discourse when studying political speech. While discourse is a broad structure of understanding, rhetoric is intentional action designed to achieve certain goals that often run contrary to the goals of one's political enemy (Moisio 2003, 69) . Rhetoric does not have limitless possibilities: it is directed and limited by discursive obstacles and frames. Nevertheless, skilful rhetoric can affect discourses, transform them and slowly even create them. A discursive change is always a significant conceptual change that signals transformations in power relations.
The AM was a rhetorical operation in the longer term reshaping of discourses about immigration, Islam, the Finnish nation and the welfare state (see Puuronen 2014; Pyrhönen 2015; Koivulaakso, Brunila & Andersson 2012) . In what follows, I will analyse the text in more detail and determine what kind of political move it actually was. I ask, what kinds of ideological discourses are the AM related to and what kinds did it further construct?
Finnish anti-immigration politics has been examined in several empirical studies (see e.g. Horsti & Nikunen 2013; Keskinen 2013; Mäkinen 2013; Pyrhönen 2014 Pyrhönen , 2015 . The approach taken in the present article perhaps comes closest to that used by Pyrhönen, who made a detailed study of 'welfare nationalism' in the antiimmigration politics of Finland. I will further the discussion about the role of different ideological perspectives that seem to be present in established anti-immigration politics as they appear in the AM.
Ideologies of the populist radical right
The rise of the European Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties and ideologies has been the topic of several comprehensive articles and books (see e.g. Tebble, A.J. 2006; Kestilä 2006; Joppke, C. 2007; Mudde 2007; Zúquete 2008; Art 2007; Zaslove 2009; Bornschier 2010; Triadafilopoulos, T. 2011; Paloheimo 2012; Koivulaakso, Brunila & Andersson 2012; Bale 2012; Jungar & Jupskås 2014; Pyrhönen 2015) . My particular focus is the ideology of the 'immigration critics' in Finland. To this end, I use a theoretical framework based primarily on the ideas of two notable researchers who have contributed to the topic. The first is Dutch scholar Cas Mudde (2007 Mudde ( : 2011 , whose work has been influential and who is familiar to most of the scholars that work in the field. The second is Adam James Tebble (2008) , whose notions of new wave nationalism offer a slightly different perspective. Mudde and Tebble focus on different parts of the new nationalism, or the new radical right, and thus complement each other.
According to Mudde, '[t] he key feature of the populist radical right ideology is nativism: an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the nation-state's homogeneity' (Mudde 2010; 2007: 19) . Historically, the idea of nativism is linked to the idea that holds 'that each nation should have its own state and, although this is often left implicit, each state should have its own, single nation' (Mudde 2010) . Nationalism, however, does not require or automatically lead to nativism. Nativism is associated with certain ethnic groups, 'natives', whereas nationalism can be constructed without referring to ethnic groups. Nationalism can, for example, be associated with the more abstract value of national culture and 'values' such as freedom, equality and democracy, or even with a certain territory (Mudde 2010) .
The second salient feature that figures in Mudde's definition of the PRR ideology is authoritarianism, the belief in a firmly ordered society that is based on national traditions and conservative values (Mudde 2007; . Authoritarianism can refer to hostility towards the democratic system as such, but this is not necessarily the case. The radical right within a party system is mostly engaged with democratic rules and concentrates on specific political problems such as immigration or corruption of the 'old' parties. Authoritarianism often involves an emphasised trust in the strong rule of the state. As Laura Mackenzie states, '[w] ithin an authoritarian democracy, the rights of the people are protected by a strong, competent state upholding the law. Personal freedoms and liberties might be curtailed, but such is the price a nation must pay to protect its citizens' (Mackenzie 2013).
Unlike nativism, authoritarianism is not exclusive to the PRR ideology, but typical of several kinds of conservatism. Authoritarianism is important for both secular and religious thinking (Mudde 2010 ). In the case of the Finns Party, this point is important: the party has openly religious actors such as chairman Timo Soini, who is a Catholic and, for example, opposes same sex-marriage and is openly pro-Israel for religious reasons (see Soini 2.8.2014) , while most of the radicals in the party openly espouses a secular and anti-religious (especially anti-Islamic) ideology. Authoritarianism can hence be seen as one of the core values that is shared widely in the Finns Party, by radicals and moderates alike.
The third feature in Mudde's definition is populism. In short, populism holds that society is divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite' (Mudde 2010) . According to populists, politics should be an expression of the 'general will' of the people, populus (Mudde 2004; Mudde 2007; Mackenzie 2013) . 'The people' know what is best for them and if politics follows the will of the people, the world will be a better place. Institutional constraints such as protection of minorities, are undemocratic and should be rejected (Mudde 2010) . Populist language often has features that come close to religious speech: the people are presented as a homogenous moral entity and the purpose of democracy is to bring a 'secular redemption', a better world (Canovan 1999) . Here, one sees similarities with the most extreme 'political religions' such as totalitarianism (see Burleigh 2001) . However, populist parties are mostly engaged with the rules of the democratic system and do not pursue rule over the whole society or state.
The analysis of Adam James Tebble is not focussed solely on the new radical right, but also on the phenomenon he calls 'new wave nationalism', even though many of Tebble's examples refer to the statements of European PRR parties and politicians (Tebble 2006) . According to Tebble, there are two notions of nationalism that are usually present in (academic) discussions. The first is a nationalism that seeks to defend either 'social democratic or some other set of values' (Tebble 2006, 464) . The second 'is more conservative in its outlook and sees national identity as a good in itself and one that is in need of preserving regardless of the kind of political culture that the national identity underpins' (Tebble 2006, 464) .
A third nationalist perspective differs from the traditional liberal and conservative understandings (Tebble 2006, 465) . In Tebble's view, this 'new wave' nationalism is more in tune with contemporary nationalist sentiment than the two traditional ones and thus plays a much more significant role in shaping the political reality. According to Tebble, 'new wave nationalism appeals to progressive values yet also contains conservative aspects that claim that those values are constitutive of our identities and, as such, are non-negotiable' (Tebble 2006, 464) . These fundamental values include, for example, (secular) democracy, freedom of choice and equality of individuals. New wave nationalism typically promotes assimilation of immigrants and opposes multiculturalism (which it sees as a 'new racism' that threatens the democracy and rights of the majorities) and differencebased politics. What is peculiar to new wave nationalism is that it often employs the cultural and political language of the political left and uses it for its own purposes. As Tebble puts it, '[w]hat is particularly noteworthy about new wave nationalism is that not only can culture be invoked by the right, but that right-wing cultural policies can be justified in terms of arguments normally considered the preserve of the left' (Tebble 2006, 482) . In other words, new wave nationalism appeals to notions such as democracy, equity and cultural survival in its critiques of both multiculturalism and immigration (Tebble 2006, 482) .
One of the most important aspects of new wave nationalism is its open claim that for democracy one actually needs occasional policies of exclusion 'with respect to immigrants whose cultural backgrounds are deemed incompatible with, or even hostile towards, those of the host community' (Tebble 2006, 484) . Liberal democratic values such as individual freedom of choice and the equality of all citizens are so important that one should not tolerate religious or cultural practices that threaten them in any way. Furthermore, one should protect the Western national cultures in order to ensure their survival.
The Aloof Election Manifesto: Introduction
As the name indicates, the Aloof Election Manifesto is a political manifesto designed to promote a certain ideology and practical political choices based on it. As such, the text constructs a world where there are clear, recognised opponents. It begins with a definition of the first of these, the 'old parties'. The authors admit that in addition to the Finns Party, the 'old parties' have recently accepted the 'fact' that there are problems in Finnish immigration policy. However, according to the manifesto, these very same parties denied the existence of any problems for two decades; instead, they 'praised' immigration without any criticism (AM, section 1). This rhetorical move portrays other Finnish parties in an unreliable light: Why should anybody trust them if they are, in fact, responsible for a long-term immigration policy that is the cause of the problems that Finland is currently facing? This statement is typical of neopopulist language, insinuating that established power is corrupt and untrustworthy and that only populist politicians hold the truth or are genuinely democratic (Canovan 1999) .
The authors of the AM define their enemies as other parties and 'bad' immigration policy. They do not, however, mention immigrants as their enemies. In other contexts, the authors emphasise that they oppose Finland's immigration policy and, especially the effect of Islam on Finland, not immigrants as individuals (Jussi Halla-aho 9.10.2008 ). This is a formula consistent with the manifesto in general.
The authors emphasise the rights of individuals and state explicitly that (religious) groups should not have such rights. Yet, they value the rights of Western society, a position that I will analyse more later on.
The writers separate themselves from their enemies, especially other parties, in another respect that focusses on the content of the immigration policy. They point out that while the old parties no longer deny that there are problems in immigration policy and multiculturalism, the parties still believe that these problems can be solved through the social integration of immigrants. The authors of the manifesto disagree. They believe that the main problem is ('humanitarian') immigration (from the Third World) itself. In their view, problems related to immigration cannot be solved by investing money in social integration. They argue that if this were possible, then the problems should have been solved already. Moreover, the authors question how Finland could succeed in something that all other Western European countries have failed to accomplish (AM, section 1).
The authors admit that it is possible to control the negative effects of immigration through 'financial investments', but assert that is not a legitimate solution since it leads to the 'unequal treatment' of demographic groups (AM, section 1). This is a very typical populist demand: democracy should signify the fulfilment of the will of the majority, whose 'common sense' is able to make the world better (Mudde 2010; Mackenzie 2013) . Minorities are allowed to practice their customs and beliefs, but they should not be supported in doing so.
The introduction of the manifesto is short, but presents many core ideas of the radicals of the Finns Party. The text makes at least three fundamental claims: (1) Immigration, especially from the Third World, is a problem rather than opportunity. This implies that there must be something problematic with either the culture or nature of the immigrants themselves and, at the same time, that there is something positive in the culture of the natives. (2) Equality should not mean positive discrimination in favour of minorities; such 'unequal treatment' of demographic groups would be both unjust and dangerous. As the manifesto later clarifies, the only exception is the Finnish majority; it has every right to maintain its institutions and practices (see also Pyrhönen 2015, 9) . (3) In light of the first two claims, the manifesto goes on to assert that (3) the dominating status of the majority and existing Finnish culture should not be disrupted or undermined in any way.
Against Multiculturalism
After the short introduction, the AM concentrates on the problems of multiculturalism and puts forward more detailed demands for the immigration policy. The title of the second section is 'Repudiating Multiculturalism'. In the beginning, the authors demand that Finland needs to give up the recent multiculturalist state-ideology, which is copied from Western Europe, especially Sweden, and praises and supports disparity. (AM, section 2; all translations by T.N.)
According to the authors, the state should guarantee everybody the freedom to maintain their own culture, language, identity and religious conviction, but it should not be the 'financier' of minority identities. Satisfaction of the religious and cultural needs of immigrants is not amongst the core functions of the Finnish state, which is 'financed by taxpayers' (AM, section 2).
The authors go on to claim that to opting out of multiculturalism means that Finland should not tolerate violations of the individual rights of the immigrants. 'Rights of the group' are no excuses to mistreat women and children. The 'ritual mutilation' of genitals should be unequivocally prohibited by law, and society needs to fight against a lifestyle whereby migrant women stay home instead of being active in the labour market. Forced marriages and polygamy should be fought with determination, and individual freedom of religion should be guaranteed for minorities as well as for others (AM, section 2).
The authors continue by demanding that no new minority languages should be taught in Finnish schools. Rather, all immigrants need to learn Finnish and the financial support they receive from the state should be based on their success in language studies. In general, immigrant groups need to acculturate to Finnish public life, administration practices and working life. It is very important that they not benefit from any forms of positive discrimination. On this point, the authors claim:
Finland should be an equal society, where equality means equality of opportunity, not equality of outcomes. It is not equality if everyone reaches the finish line at the same time, but rather if everyone can start from the same line, at the same time. No kinds of ethnic quotas or positive discrimination should be allowed, for example, in recruiting public employees. (AM, section 2) This section is very important and illuminating for the manifesto as a whole and the ideology of its authors. Many other sections in the text contain detailed lists of political actions that support the demands put forward here. They also contain some unique demands and premises -which I analyse below -but the core ideas of the manifesto are already presented by this point.
First, multiculturalism is truly an enemy to the authors of the manifesto; in fact, opposition to it can be considered the fourth (4) principal claim of the manifesto. The authors do not see any significant varieties or positive possibilities within multiculturalism; it is simply an unfair ideology that leads to unwanted outcomes. Some of these consequences are described in the manifesto. Multiculturalism is associated with unequal treatment of immigrant women and violations of several individual rights. Moreover, multiculturalism is too expensive for Finnish society as public services already have scanty resources.
The authors of the manifesto have clarified their opposition to multiculturalism elsewhere. Jussi Halla-aho, Olli Immonen and James Hirvisaari have claimed that multiculturalism leads to societal problems such as crime (especially rape) and eventually to serious conflicts between ethnic groups (Jussi Halla-aho 6.5.2008; James Hirvisaari 19.1.2010; Olli Immonen 28.10.2013). Furthermore, multiculturalism leads to an unwanted cultural and religious transformation: Christianity, in its true form, is being lost; it is transforming into Chrislam, a syncretic religion that combines features of Christianity and Islam (Olli Immonen 9.1.2014). Ultimately, through demographic transition, multicultural politics will transform Western secular and Christian societies into Islamic societies where Sharia law is the legal norm (Olli Immonen 28.10.2013).
One should note that Islam is mentioned explicitly in the AM only once (according the authors, Muslim doctors and nurses should not be allowed to refuse to treat the opposite sex). Additionally, citizens of Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan -all typical representatives of the 'Islamic countries' in Finnish political parlance -are mentioned as examples of those who can use family reunification in a way that the authors regard as problematic. It seems that authors do not want to represent themselves solely as adversaries of a particular religious group, but as advocates of individual rights and freedom. However this may be, there is no doubt that, for the authors, the principal problem associated with multiculturalism is indeed the Muslim immigration: they make this extremely clear in several texts and public speeches both before and after release of the AM (see Pyrhönen 2015; Koivulaakso, Brunila & Andersson 2012, Jussi Halla-aho: Scripta).
Second, forced marriages, polygamy and ritual mutilation are represented as something that we can expect from immigrants. The authors do not specify the particular national, religious or ethnic groups. Violations of physical and mental integrity are simply things that belong to immigrants' culture. This explains to some extent at least why the authors of the AM view foreign (non-Western) cultures as problematic. Immigrants seem to embody a figure of primitive humans with primitive practices.
Third, the second section further clarifies the discourse, which maintains that rights and responsibilities belong to individuals, not to ethnic or religious groups. The only group that has specific rights is the Finnish majority, which is represented as a homogeneous group of 'taxpayers'. In the second last section -which demands that Finland should stop paying annual development aid financed by taxes -the image of the faceless taxpayer is slightly clarified. Finns are 'client-owners' of the Finnish state, a metaphor that identifies the state with a co-operative shop or corporation (Perelman 1996: 135-137) . A state should operate (primarily or exclusively) for its 'owners'' benefit and according to the authors, aid for developing countries does not serve this purpose. Here, the section highlights at least two interesting features: First, paying taxes is something that has a great positive value and second, the state can reasonably be compared to a trusteeship or corporation.
The rest of the AM, before the conclusion, contains more detailed demands regarding how Finnish immigration policy should be practiced in the future. I will present the rest of the sections briefly and analyse some of the themes, which further illuminate the discourses constructed in the text.
The manifesto continues by demanding drastic changes in Finnish policy and practices pertaining to asylum seekers. The text creates a discourse in which asylum seekers have -almost without exception -no legitimate reason to apply for asylum:
An extremely small proportion of the asylum seekers who arrive in Finland will be granted asylum. This is because an extremely small proportion are refugees as described in international conventions, whose protection Finland is legally bound. Most of the asylum seekers are on the move because of financial reasons or the general circumstances in their country of origin. (AM, section 3) This so-called 'social migration' (AM, section 12) is very problematic in the eyes of the authors. It is 'very expensive' and it creates ghettos and social tensions. The authors do not mention any potential general positive consequences such as long-term benefits to the economy. In their rhetoric, asylum seekers are simply a threat to our (the Finnish people's) welfare.
The authors go on to list actions that could reduce the attractiveness of Finland in the eyes of migrants. For example, the reuniting of family members should be linked to the residing immigrants' ability to take care of their family members themselves without social aid (AM, section 7). The number of refugees accepted into the country should be tied to the general financial development of the country (AM, section 4). Newcomers should be selected from 'national and religious' groups that have integrated well in Finland before. The birth of ghettos in the cities should be prevented.
Continuous troubles in European suburbs show what lies ahead for
Finland if immigrants are allowed to form enclaves without any real connections to the rest of society (AM, section 5). Immigrants should be given accommodation where it is cheapest to arrange, which often is not in the cities.
There should be limits on the social aid available to immigrants: an acceptable maximum for receiving aid could be 1 year (AM, section 6). Another possibility is to give up social aid and replace it with a cheap loan. Immigrants who are guilty of serious crimes should be deported immediately (AM, section 8). If immigrants visit their home countries for a vacation or if they take part in war, they should also be deported. If newcomers lie to Finnish officials, they should be deported as well. Citizenship is a reward that should only be given to those who have earned it (AM, section 9). In a nutshell, to get Finnish citizenship, an immigrant should have to learn Finnish, not be dependent on social aid and not have a serious crime history. Citizenship should first be conditional and it could be revocable if the requirements are no longer fulfilled. The 'real costs' of immigration should be evaluated by a special truth commission (AM, section 10). Moreover, Finland should discontinue its current aid to developing countries (AM, section 11). If any such aid is given, it should be collected voluntarily from citizens. The authors maintain that Finland should not be a 'global ethical actor':
In our view, Finland as a state should not present itself as a global ethical actor. The State of Finland is primarily a trusteeship to serve its client-owners, the citizens who pay taxes. One of its core functions is to guarantee the conditions for the welfare of Finns. (AM, section 11)
In the concluding section, the authors reiterate that Finland has neither the money nor responsibility to act as a global 'social services office' (AM, section 12). The government should be strict with immigration that has negative effects on Finnish society, while, at the same time, Finland should be open to immigration that has neutral or positive effects on society. Immigrants who integrate themselves and earn their living are welcome in the country. Finally, the authors claim that 'ordinary immigrants' value the same things that 'ordinary Finns' do: moderate taxes, good education, a peaceful society and everyday safety (AM, section 12). 'Bad immigration' chips away the foundation of these values. The more open-handedly Finland treats 'social immigrants', the less it can compete for 'good and skilful' immigrants. This short section is very important for my research questions in that it sums up the rest of the key claims of the manifesto: (5) Finland is not a 'global ethical actor' or a 'social services office', but rather an economic mechanism that should benefit its 'owners', that is, taxpayers. (6) The biggest problem is the 'social immigration' that brings immigrants to Finland who are opposite to or the antithesis of 'good and skilful' immigrants who contribute positively to society. In this discourse, asylum seekers clearly pose a threat to Finnish welfare; they are not represented as people who need help or are on the move with legitimate motives, but as people who come just to get free benefits.
The discourses of nation, individual and money
Next, I will take a look at how well the ideology that is present in the AM fits in with Mudde's and Pebbles' general categories and definitions. I first sketch the discourses that seem to form the foundation of the ideology espoused by the authors of the Aloof Election Manifesto. I have reconstructed the discourses based on the claims enumerated above and in the blog entries and other texts of the manifesto's authors.
I describe the discourses through their core claims. Discourses are, by definition, more general ways of understanding, which means that it is not possible to describe them exhaustively in one or two sentences. However, discourses do consist of non-negotiable and fundamental principles that limit the rhetoric inside the discourse. a) Discourse of national values. Cultures and nation-states, especially European ones, are valuable as such and need to be protected. b) Discourse of evil Islam. Islam is one, fundamentally problematic culture. There is no meaningful heterogeneity inside Islam. c) Discourse of rights as an individual property. Rights are something that are associated with the individual. Hence, religious or ethnic communities are not subjects with rights, only individuals are. Individuals are equal. d) Discourse of national self-determination. The community of the Finnish majority, white, 'original' Finns, has the right to choose whom it accepts to join itself; accordingly, some (political) communities have legitimate rights while others do not. e) Discourse of national economic selfishness as a reasonable action. The state is a corporation or trusteeship of its owners, that is, its citizens who pay taxes, and it has no duty to help citizens of other states. Citizenship itself should be a reward: until they show that they are worthy, immigrants should be no more than modern metics with limited political rights. f)
Discourse of good and bad immigrants. In the world, there are 'good' people and their antitheses. Finland should pick those who are 'good' and 'ordinary' instead of others. Asylum seekers are not good. g) Discourse of political unreliability. The old parties (old power)
are not trustworthy: they have not even revealed the real costs of immigration.
According to Cas Mudde, the ideology of the new radical right is typically nativist, populist and authoritarian. How well does the AM fit in here?
The manifesto seems to best fulfil Mudde's first and most important definition. There is a clear tone of ethno-nationalism in which Finnish and Western culture, in general, is superior compared to the cultures of immigrants. Cultural relativism is not acceptable or justified. The second definition is also fulfilled. The style of the text is populist in that it is meant to appeal to ordinary Finnish people. The old parties are not trustworthy; what they say is just political rhetoric. However, the populist tone in the AM is not as dominating as it is, for example, in the speeches of the Finns Party Chairman, Timo Soini, who, by his own definition, is first and foremost a populist (Soini 4.6.2010) . Maybe populism per se is not the most important issue for the authors of the AM: It seems to be more like a tool to achieve nativist political goals.
The authoritarianism in the AM seems to be of the kind that Laura Mackenzie (2013) calls 'democratic authoritarianism'. This refers to the idea that the rules defined in democratic process are superior to other kinds of rules, especially religious ones in this case. In contrast, the authors of the AM emphasise the freedom of the individual. It seems that the ideology of the anti-immigrant wing in the Finns Party is only partially authoritarian; it also has a strong (neo)liberal emphasis, which makes it more complex.
The last point is, I believe, very important. According to Tebble, one of the most characteristic features of new wave nationalism is its ability to surprise and challenge the old categories of political Right and Left. New wave nationalism has conservative and exclusive elements, but it also values the rights of the individual in liberal terms (see also Triadafilopoulos 2011 ). This feature is clearly visible in the AM, which repeatedly emphasises that the rights of individuals should not be violated regardless of what the religious or communal reasons are.
The AM clearly represents new wave nationalism in other respects as well. It opposes multiculturalism in the name of individual equality and promotes national assimilation. It also constantly emphasises that the rights of the majorities -the Finnish majority -should be protected. Interestingly, the text mentions democracy explicitly only once -the authors demand that financial support for developing countries must be tied to their achievements in promoting democracy (AM, section 11).
There are features in the paper that neither Mudde nor Tebble really focus on (even though both are well aware of them). The first is the evil nature of Islam. Even though Islam is mentioned explicitly only once, the most problematic immigration is clearly seen as coming from Islamic countries. This notion is amplified in the other texts written by the authors. In their blog entries, the opposition to multiculturalism seems to be based primarily on the idea that it actually only promotes the cause of Islam. Islam here could be seen merely as an example of the non-democratic ideology that new wave nationalism opposes. However, it is also possible to see Islam and non-democratic ideology as synonymous, as no other examples of such an ideology are mentioned.
Another important point is that the AM speaks a great deal about economic matters. Actually, the consequences of multiculturalism and immigration are most often portrayed in economic terms. For instance, 'social immigration' (AM, section 12) is considered an abuse of the Finnish welfare system and is seen as an enormous problem. According to the manifesto, Finland does not need immigrants who are looking only for economic benefits; instead, the country should aim to attract 'good' immigrants who will benefit it. In addition, the AM expresses clear welfare chauvinism: The state is owned by its citizens and it should economically benefit them only, not others (see Pyrhönen 2013; 2015) . Immigrants need to prove themselves worthy of social aid by acculturating into Finnish society. Even the unreliability of the old parties is described in economic terms: there is a need for a truth commission tasked with investigating the real costs of immigration, which implies that those in power have not revealed this figure to the people.
Conclusion
Reading and analysing the AM in light of the theories by Cas Mudde and Adam James Tebble reinforces the impression that the ideologies represented by PRR parties are not straightforward. First, the nationalism the AM represents is indeed different than more traditional -liberal/social-democrat and conservative -notions of nationalism. It promotes the discourses of a liberal individualism and an extensive Western nation-state. At the same time, it has 'democratic authoritarian' features and is ready to exclude practices and groups that it feels are threats to the traditional Finnish lifestyle. In addition, it has a clear enemy in the religion of Islam and Islamic culture, which it portrays as a fundamentally homogenous and problematic totality. Importantly, the authors of the AM seem to understand religion solely as an individual choice. This means that communal dimensions of religion are not recognised as meaningful in a positive sense, no matter how essential they may be for members of the religious communities (see Bhargava 2010) .
The significance of economic matters for PRR ideologies remains an interesting and partly unclear question in light of the AM. It has been claimed that contemporary far right parties emphasise socio-cultural issues and are involved mostly in identity politics. Economic issues are secondary for both the parties and their voters . In times of economic crisis, far right parties have little to offer and their voters will either not vote or will look for a party with more plausible economic competence . However, the AM clearly emphasises economic considerations. Discourse that separates good immigrants from bad immigrants is strongly connected to the economic matters, as is the discourse that emphasises Finland's right to be selfish and use tax money solely to benefit its 'owners'. The unreliability of old parties is portrayed in economic terms. How should this be understood?
One way to approach the problem is to take a look at the political context of the AM, the Euro crisis. In Finland, the crisis harmed exports, created unemployment and affected the general atmosphere amongst voters. As the discussion surrounding the elections in 2011 in Finland clearly showed, for many, it was very difficult to understand why Finland should support Greece when its own economy had serious problems. Even more importantly, Greeks and other 'southerners' were often portrayed as 'lazy' in contrast to hard-working and reliable Finns. This discourse created a fertile ground for the claims presented in the AM: immigrants from the south are mostly after 'our money'.
Previous research shows that especially this kind of economic rationale has been important to the Finnish anti-immigrant movement at the grass-roots level (Mäkinen 2013) . In the internet discussions that Katariina Mäkinen analyses, the value of immigrants was measured especially in light of their ability to bring added value to the Finnish economy (Mäkinen 2013) . Similarly, Niko Pyrhönen's research shows that an economic rationale has been at the very heart of anti-immigration discussions in Finland, the sentiment being 'The welfare belongs to us, and immigrants pose a fundamental threat to that welfare' (Pyrhönen 2013; 2015) . Hence, while it is possible that people seek options with more plausible economic competence in times of economic crisis that are harmful enough, it is at least as obvious that representatives of new wave nationalism employ economic talk for their political purposes. Possible economic harm is a concrete pivot in the wider discourse where bad people are coming to take what belongs to us (see also Skey 2010; .
Another slightly different example of the complicated relationship of economic matters and new wave nationalism can be found in the AM. If the state is reduced to a trusteeship or a corporation, its value should logically be estimated at least primarily in economic rather than political terms. The state works well if it creates material wealth for its 'owners'. This, in turn, indicates that the state is not founded on things such as power, identities or feelings, but on cold, calculating rationality. In other words, the state becomes depoliticised.
However, at the same time, 'natural differences' between nations and cultures, 'ethnopluralism' and ethno-nationalism, have been things that advocates of the new wave nationalism -including the authors of the AM -have systematically praised, in particular (Koivulaakso, Brunila & Andersson 2012: 50; Mudde 2007: 19; Pyrhönen 2015, 1 ; see also Suomen Sisu: Periaatteet). According to this discourse, all nations are natural, 'organic' and unique entities and, as such, worth protecting. In other words, relatively homogeneous nations, and maybe also the nation-states based on them, have a metaphysical value per se. When one combines the cold rationality of the AM with these religious-like beliefs in national homogeneity and cultural superiority, the ideology starts to become reminiscent of traditional, conservative nationalism (see Tebble 2006) . Such a combination of stone-cold rationality and religious-like sentiment is perhaps even more familiar from twentieth century totalitarianism (see Burleigh 2011; Arendt 1963; . However, it would be going too far to claim that new wave nationalism is simply an ideological descendant of totalitarianism. As Tebble and McKenzie point out, and the AM shows, new nationalism is not usually even openly authoritarian in a traditional sense. On the contrary, politicians from the new radical right often represent themselves as advocates of democracy (what 'democracy' in this discourse means is, of course, another question). However, this may be, it is clear that new wave nationalism is indeed a mixture of multiple ideological features and discourses. It is a combination of traditional nationalist sentiment and neoliberal individualism 2 , modern secularism, fear or suspicions of Islam and chauvinism that defends the (Nordic) welfare state. This indicates, in turn, that new wave nationalism has many alternative directions to follow in the future. This means that in the future, we need research on international politics, but perhaps even more research on local political and social developments to see how the discourses develop.
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